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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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1. Moscow has already started to prepare working plans for Manchuria's rehabilitation. Many experts on Manchuria (newly repatriated Russians who at one time lived in Manchuria as emigres) have received assignments in the regions of Siberia near Manchuria--mostly in Irkutsk, Chita and Khabarovsk. These experts will be used in working out plans for the rehabilitation of Manchuria.
2. Many persons in Shanghai whose names were on the repatriation list are now exempted from repatriation by an order signed by Lozovsky. These persons have received or have been promised new assignments. Included among these are (1) L. V. Grosse, an employee of Tass News Agency in Shanghai, who has been notified that he will remain in Shanghai working for Tass and that he may eventually proceed to Japan and Korea (position unknown); and (2) Dr. S. Shendrikov, who has been informed that he may be invited to take a job in Korea (? as a physician).
3. At present the Shanghai Soviet Consulate and the Shanghai office of Torgpredstvo are busy compiling lists of specially qualified Soviet citizens for work in Manchuria and Korea.
4. M. A. Borodin, former Russian emigre industrialist in Harbin, has already sent his two sons to the USSR; he had planned to remain in Shanghai and to help his sons by sending them parcels and money. However, he was called to the Shanghai Soviet Consulate recently and was informed that Moscow has finally considered his case regarding his properties in Manchuria and that he may prepare for a trip within the next two or three months to Moscow where he will be informed of his new important assignment. As Borodin understands it, Moscow has decided to start a new economic policy in Harbin by putting into operation those industrial enterprises which belong to Russians and which by present conditions are easily put in order and exploited. Borodin was promised that his enterprises in Harbin will be handed to him and he will be recognized as the owner. But he must be prepared to supervise all industrial activity in Harbin and along the Harbin-Manchouli and Harbin-Suifenho railways as the USSR representative in a joint Chinese-Soviet Industrial Committee. His main and most urgent job will be to push work on

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the Harbin flour mills, oil refinery, spirits factories and railway repair shops. In principle Borodin accepted this proposal and he expects that by the end of this year he will board a steamer for Vladivostok. He told the Consulate that he preferred to visit Harbin and inspect the situation on the spot prior to his trip to Moscow.

In Borodin's analysis, USSR policy and intentions regarding Manchuria and the Far East are:

- (1) Moscow expects that the USSR and the United States will soon openly conflict over Japan, Korea and Manchuria. As a consequence, each power will pursue independently its own policies in the Far East. This means that Korea will be divided into two independent zones and that Manchuria will be indefinitely under USSR control, after the Japanese peace treaty has been concluded without USSR participation.
- (2) If the expected re-approach by Moscow to Nanking to find a solution to Far Eastern problems, particularly those of China and Manchuria, is met with refusal by the Chinese Government, then Moscow will go into Manchuria along with the present local (Communist) Manchuria administration with the firm determination to re-establish the railway system, industry and agriculture, and will maintain law and order in Manchuria with joint USSR-Chinese Communist forces.
- (3) The USSR has firmly held Port Arthur and Dairen and has brought under its indirect control the whole area of Manchuria north of Changchun. Moscow had the idea that as a result of holding these areas? the USSR would get time to maneuver on broader? Far Eastern problems. One of Moscow's firm beliefs is that Nanking, sooner or later, will prefer to bind the fate of China to the USSR instead of to the United States. Moscow expects this reorientation of China's policy to come later, when China has come to realize that only the USSR can easily solve China's internal problems, bringing real unity for China without the threat of "bolshevization" of the country.

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